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Abstract
Icelandic politics are analysed from the perspectives of  three normative mod-
els of  democracy: the liberal, republican and deliberative democratic theories. 
While the Icelandic constitution is rooted in classical liberal ideas, Icelandic pol-
itics can be harshly criticized from a liberal perspective, primarily because of  the 
unclear separation of  powers of  government and for the extensive involvement 
of  politics in other social sectors. Despite strong nationalist discourse which 
reflects republican characteristics, rooted in the struggle for independence from 
Denmark, republicanism has been marginal in Icelandic politics. In the years 
before the financial collapse, Icelandic society underwent a process of  liberali-
zation in which power shifted to the financial sector without disentangling the 
close ties that had prevailed between business and politics. The special commis-
sion set up by the Icelandic Parliament to investigate the causes of  the financial 
collapse criticized Icelandic politics and governance for its flawed working prac-
tices and lack of  professionalism. The appropriate lessons to draw from this 
criticism are to strengthen democratic practices and institutions. In the spirit 
of  republicanism, however, the dominant discourse about Icelandic democracy 
after the financial collapse has been on increasing direct, vote-centric participa-
tion in opposition to the system of  formal politics. While this development is 
understandable in light of  the loss of  trust in political institutions in the wake 
of  the financial collapse, it has not contributed to trustworthy practices. In or-
der to improve Icelandic politics, the analysis in this paper shows, it is important 
to work more in the spirit of  deliberative democratic theory.
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culture; republicanism.
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Introduction
In this paper, Icelandic politics are evaluated in light of  the main philosophical ideas 
of  democracy. In the first section, I describe the analytical framework, which draws 
partly on Habermas’s distinction between three normative models of  democracy. I then 
tease out three main features of  each model that I will use for my subsequent analysis. 
In the second section, I discuss the constitutional arrangement and Icelandic political 
practices in light of  these ideas. I argue that, while the political structure reflects clas-
sical liberal ideas, the republican idea of  national self-government has been prominent 
in political discourse, rooted largely in the struggle for independence from Denmark. 
However, Iceland’s actual political practices are not strongly characterized by either lib-
eral or republican ideas. To the contrary, I argue that Icelandic politics can be heavily 
criticized from a liberal perspective and that republicanism has, for the most part, been 
marginal. In the third section, I argue that this changed radically in the period before 
the financial crisis, which was characterized by the liberalization of  the financial sector, 
and in the wake of  the crisis, when republican ideas became dominant in the political 
discourse. Further, I discuss the Special Investigation Commission’s (SIC) criticism of  
flawed governance in the advent of  the financial crisis when the financial sector had 
become dominant in Icelandic society. I then evaluate the reaction of  the government 
to the crisis from a liberal perspective. In the fourth section, I analyse the SIC’s report 
main criticism which revealed severe weaknesses in democratic working practices and 
institutions. I argue that this criticism reflects some of  the main tenets of  deliberative 
democratic theory that can provide valuable guidance to the political reconstruction. 
While the official reactions to the report emphasized the need to improve the political 
system and culture, the dominant reactions to the collapse have been characterized more 
by emphasis on direct democracy. The democratic exercises that have been undertaken 
have not, however, been successful due to weaknesses in democratic practices and insti-
tutions that have characterized Icelandic politics for a long time.
1. Analytical framework
In this attempt to analyse Icelandic politics from a theoretical perspective, I choose 
to work with three ideal types of  democracy, the liberal model, the republican model 
and the discourse deliberative model. This tripartite distinction covers well the general 
spectrum of  normative theories and can be helpful for analysing Icelandic democratic 
practices and assessing their strengths and weaknesses (Árnason 2013a).1 The labels are 
taken from Habermas’s (1996, 289–314; 1999b, 239–252) analysis of  “normative mod-
els of  democracy”, but I will not restrict myself  to his interpretations of  these models; 
rather, I will draw on other sources as I see fit. It is appropriate to describe their main 
characteristics before discussing Icelandic politics. Inevitably, this description reflects 
my interpretations of  the models and their most relevant features for the current con-
text. Moreover, each of  the three theories chosen implies, in fact, a range of  different 
features and even competing visions. It is important to bear in mind that theoretical 




tions of  actual political practices in which attributes from different models are inter-
woven in a complex way for historically contingent reasons. I must also be selective in 
my discussion; I don’t say anything, for example, about the judiciary power, the role of  
which certainly deserves attention in this context but would require separate research.
The liberal model of  democracy is the most straightforward of  the three. Here, the 
emphasis is on the institutional structure and processes intended to limit the authority 
of  the government and to ensure that the rights of  all citizens and the will of  the major-
ity are respected. I single out three main features that I take to be most important. The 
first is the protection argument, emphasizing that the main point of  liberal politics is to 
protect the citizens from authoritarian and arbitrary use of  power. This objective calls 
for a separation of  the legislative, executive and judicial branches of  government, which 
can provide checks and balances of  the use of  power. This arrangement is often de-
scribed in a constitution along with the basic civil rights of  the citizens, protecting their 
personal domain from illegitimate interference. Concomitant with this is the second 
main feature of  liberal democracy, namely, emphasis on the negative liberty of  citizens. 
This implies that the citizens should be free from political participation and leave po-
litical affairs to elected representatives who form the legislative body and, most often, 
the government.2 This requires regular elections through which the citizens give their 
representatives legitimacy to exercise state power on their behalf  and for which they are 
held accountable in general elections. The third main feature of  liberal democracy is 
that politics “is regarded as a distinct and separate sphere in society, a sphere set apart 
from economy, culture and family life” (Held 2006, 77). This separation of  the world of  
politics from other spheres of  society was an important aspect of  the secularization of  
society, freeing politics from religious ties. But it has also had profound effects on the vi-
sions of  the citizens as private consumers pursuing their private interests in civil society 
and on freeing the domestic sphere from political regulation. 
The liberal model of  democracy has its historical roots in the seventeenth and eight-
eenth centuries in relation to attempts to set limits to the power of  absolute monarchs, 
as captured in the ideas of  writers such as John Locke (1689) and Charles de Montes-
quieu (1748). The roots of  the republican model extend much longer back in history, 
and it refers primarily to the idea of  the self-government of  free citizens. There have 
been historical variations as to who are included in the category of  “free citizens”, 
but, here, I will only consider modern versions of  republicanism which take the moral 
equality of  citizens for granted.3 Again, I single out three main features that I take to be 
most important. The first is the development argument, which emphasizes that only by 
directly engaging in political thinking and decision making will the members of  society 
mature as political citizens This also leads to protection of  citizens’ rights and interests 
by making them more vigilant and aware of  the misuse of  political authority.4 This im-
plies the second main feature of  the republican model of  democracy: the positive liberty 
of  citizens to have an impact on the ruling of  the polity. Thus, the citizens should be 
encouraged to engage in political participation that breeds the civic virtues necessary 
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the authors of  the laws that they are subject to than that the laws maximize their (nega-
tive) civic liberties, as is the main concern of  the liberal model. The third main feature 
of  the republican model is that the rule of  self-governing expresses the national will and 
the values that the people the most important.5 This is often articulated in opposition 
to formal politics and the state apparatus. This may call for frequent elections, such as 
national referenda, to bring forth the national will on controversial political issues. 
The third model of  democracy I use for my analysis is the discourse theoretical or 
deliberative model. I do not see it as a distinct alternative to the previous models but, 
rather, as a way to critically reconstruct democratic politics by emphasizing three fea-
tures that are not sufficiently acknowledged in them. The first is rational will formation 
in politics, which emphasizes the quality of  policy and decision-making. This can be 
compared to the rational decision making of  an individual who deliberates on an issue 
and seeks advice from knowledgeable people before he or she makes a decision. In poli-
tics, the task is to seek good solutions to collective problems, and the vehicle for that is 
informed reasoning and deliberation in politics and administration. This calls for both 
professional work practices in preparing the decisions and clear public policy goals to 
guide them. The second feature of  this democratic model is the public accountability 
of  elected representatives and public administrators who are required to justify political 
decisions. This aspect was well described by Simone Chambers (2003, 308), who focuses 
on the conditions for the democratic legitimacy of  public policy rather than citizen par-
ticipation: “Thus, accountability is primarily understood in terms of  ‘giving an account’ 
of  something, that is, publicly articulating, explaining, and most importantly justifying 
public policy”. This enables the citizens to assess political practices and provides condi-
tions for informed public discussion about political affairs. The third main feature of  
this model is the need for strong institutions to sustain quality governance and demo-
cratic practices. This includes both the institutions of  formal politics but also regula-
tors and other actors in the informal public sphere, such as the media, which facilitate 
democratic opinion and will formation. As Habermas (1996b, 248) wrote: “Discourse 
theory does not make the success of  deliberative politics depend on a collectively acting 
citizenry but on the institutionalization of  corresponding procedures”. In this way, con-
ditions are made for communicative action which can resist the prevailing social forces 
of  money and administrative power.
2. Constitutional arrangement and Icelandic politics
In this section, I briefly discuss the Icelandic Constitution and the reality of  Icelandic 
politics in light of  the analytical framework that I have described. While the Icelandic 
Constitution does not contain the concept of  democracy, it does describe an institu-
tional arrangement which rests on traditional ideas of  liberal democratic governance. 
The Icelandic Constitution is based on the Danish Constitution, which was established 
in 1849 and reflects the prevailing ideas in Europe at that time (Líndal 2011). Among 
them are the division of  the legislative, executive and judicial powers, which has been at 




basic human rights. There is nothing distinctive about this in the Icelandic constitutional 
arrangement. What is special in the Icelandic Constitution, which was instituted in 1944, 
is the role of  the president, who replaced the monarch in the Danish Constitution. This 
called for provisions regarding how a democratic president should be elected and what 
his powers should be.6 The result was that the president should be elected directly by 
the people, which, from a republican point of  view, might be seen as giving the office 
a strong standing as a guardian of  the national will (Kristjánsson 2002, 27–28, 38). The 
interpretation of  this depends, of  course, both on the constitutional articles about the 
powers of  the President and how they have been interpreted in practice. The Consti-
tution states (art. 2) that the president and the Parliament “jointly exercise legislative 
power” and that the president and other governmental authorities exercise executive 
power. But it also states (art. 11): “The President of  the Republic may not be held ac-
countable for executive acts”. The relationship between the president and the legislature 
is more complicated and controversial. The signature of  the president is required for a 
legislative act to be validated; however, the Constitution states the following regarding 
the event of  the president refusing to sign an act of  law (art. 26):
If  the President rejects a bill, it shall nevertheless become valid but 
shall, as soon as circumstances permit, be submitted to a vote by se-
cret ballot of  all those eligible to vote, for approval or rejection. The 
law shall become void if  rejected, but otherwise retains its force.
For the first sixty years of  the republic, no Icelandic president refused to sign an act of  
law, and this article was widely regarded as a dead letter. This changed in 2004, when the 
president refused to sign an act from Parliament on ownership of  the media. At that 
time, the government withdrew the act, so the procedure did not follow the Constitu-
tion as described in article 26. However, this power of  the president was to play a major 
role in the events after the financial collapse, as will be discussed below. What interests 
me here is how this role of  the president in the Constitution resonates with theoretical 
ideas of  democracy. I have already mentioned the republican interpretation of  seeing 
the president as an embodiment of  the national will. But it is possible to take a more 
liberal standpoint and see the president as an additional restraint on the use of  power. 
When the government, supported by the parliamentary majority, oversteps the limits of  
legitimate power, the president can serve as an emergency brake and refer the law to the 
nation. The point of  this arrangement, it has been argued (Thorarensen & Óskarsdóttir 
2015, 147), is that the nation, in fact, exercises restraint on the president’s use of  power. 
This squares well with the protective argument for liberal democracy while, at the same 
time, resounding the developmental argument of  republicanism since it requires the na-
tion to think the matter over and make up its own mind in a referendum. However, the 
weaknesses of  this arrangement are more obvious from a liberal perspective because it 
can threaten the stability of  a government that has been legitimately established and is 
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tions below.
In assessing Icelandic politics from a theoretical perspective, it is very limiting to 
look at the constitutional arrangements; it is more revealing to look broadly at actual 
political practices and see how they are in line with or deviate from the ideas discussed 
in the analytical models above. This is no easy task, but I will attempt to unravel certain 
dominant features that political scientists and historians have observed in their research 
of  politics in the Icelandic Republic. To begin, it is relevant to place this discussion in a 
historical context because the struggle for independence from Denmark had a profound 
effect on the development of  Icelandic politics. The ideological core of  that movement 
was the demand for national independence, or freedom of  the Icelandic nation from the 
domination of  another nation and the right of  the former to govern itself.7 From that 
perspective, the republican idea of  national liberty (þjóðfrelsi) is more important than the 
liberal idea of  individual liberty (einstaklingsfrelsi). It has even been asked whether the Ice-
landic struggle for national freedom was partly rooted in the attempt to resist the liberal 
policy of  the Danish government (Hálfdanarson 2001, 76). For example, Denmark had 
adopted progressive ideas about the rights of  labourers which would have undermined 
the authority of  Icelandic farmers over their workers (Kristinsson 2007, 21). Already in 
the period before Iceland obtained home rule in 1904, there were interesting tensions 
in Icelandic independence politics. For example, the prominent political leader Hannes 
Hafstein argued that it was more important to fight for human rights in a liberal legisla-
tion than to fight for a republican home rule.8 The hero of  the Icelandic independence 
movement, Jón Sigurðsson, was inspired by liberal ideas but had to show realistic and 
skilful patience in his dealings with his countrymen, who were often concerned with 
protecting traditional restriction of  liberties. The Jón Sigurðsson’s liberal ideas were, 
however, also mixed with nationalist ideas about political self-government as the free 
self-expression of  a people’s identity, which has republican features. This shows how 
complex it can be to discuss the influence of  theoretical notions in a concrete historical 
context where ideas rooted in different ideological soil are interwoven.
The long history of  Denmark’s rule over Iceland put its mark both on developments 
of  the Icelandic political system and of  the political discourse and ideology (Einarsson 
2014, Ch. 1). These can be traced and assessed from the perspectives of  both liberal and 
republican models of  democracy. From the liberal perspective, it is important to note 
that the Icelandic administration (or the professional side of  the executive power) was, 
for a long time, part of  the Danish government. In the years 1872–1904, the office of  
the Governor of  Iceland (Landshöfðingi) was instrumental in strengthening the Danish 
executive power in the country. During the time of  the home-rule (1904–1918), the 
Icelandic minister was also formally part of  the Danish government, although domestic 
public administration started in this period. Thus, the Icelandic executive power devel-
oped very late and was not only professionally weak, due to lack of  experience, but also 
met with opposition from the Icelandic people, who were traditionally distrustful of  
public officials who, for a long time, had been associated with foreign domination (Kris-




that it had the power to set the political agenda and public policy. This also secured the 
stronghold of  regional representatives who were dominant in Parliament, emphasizing 
the interests of  the farmers who resisted the processes of  modernization and urbaniza-
tion (Ásgeirsson 1988). This meant that the checks and balances of  power that charac-
terize the institutional arrangement of  liberal democracy were not in place in Iceland in 
the years when the Icelandic state was in the early stages of  development. This has had 
profound consequences for Icelandic politics.
This relative strength of  the legislative assembly has been one of  the main character-
istics of  Icelandic politics. Comparative analysis of  the Nordic legislative assemblies has 
shown that the Icelandic Parliament is much more active in the process of  legislation 
than the other national parliaments (Kristinsson 2018). Many more changes are made 
to government bills in the Icelandic Parliament than the others, often at the last minute 
before the end of  the parliamentary session. This is in line with the view that has been 
pervasive in Icelandic politics that it is a major role of  Parliament to write the bills or 
at least make its mark on them so as not to be the handmaiden of  the executive sector. 
This seems to have been conflated with the supervisory role of  the Parliament, which 
consists of  holding the executive power in constraint. In fact, this role of  Parliament 
has been neglected largely because of  a strong majoritarian rule, which implies that the 
ministers of  government come from the ruling coalition parties which together are 
backed by a majority of  the members of  Parliament.9 The ministers and the speaker of  
the House of  Parliament are typically leading figures within their parties and control 
the agenda of  the Parliament. At the same time, the standing of  the minority in Parlia-
ment has been relatively weak. This system, in combination with an adversary style of  
parliamentary discussion and characterized by partisan bickering, works in favour of  the 
ruling parties which, thus, control both the legislative and the executive sectors without 
much restraint. In practice, the main conflict has been between the majority and minor-
ity within Parliament rather than between the legislative and the executive branches (Hel-
gadóttir, Kjartansson & Magnússon 2011, 223; Thorarensen & Óskarsdóttir 2015, 153). 
On top of  this, Icelandic governance is characterized by an exceptionally strong min-
isterial rule in which each minister has authority over administrative affairs in their re-
spective ministries without having to consult their fellow members of  government. This 
independence of  the ministers conflicts with the fact that the government has a mandate 
from the parliamentary majority and is accountable to that majority for their policy deci-
sions (Kristinsson 2007, 57). Moreover, ministerial power does not meet much restraint 
by the professional side of  the executive branch, which has been rather weak although 
professionalization has increased in the last decades. For a long time, political appoint-
ments of  public officials were frequent, which made it difficult to distinguish between 
the political and the professional sides of  the executive branch, undermining impartiality 
and trust in public administration (Kristinsson 2007, 214–220). Finally, in a liberal soci-
ety, restraint on the exercise of  political power needs to come from an independent and 
professional media. The conditions for this are inevitably weak in a small society where 
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For the first four decades of  the Republic, the newspapers acted as mouthpieces for the 
political parties, and the board of  the national radio was controlled by the ruling parties 
(Karlsson & Broddason 2018). 
This is only one example of  the significant intervention of  Icelandic politicians in 
other sectors of  society that, from a liberal perspective, should be free from politics. 
Before the privatization of  the banks around the beginning of  this century, the political 
parties had their representatives on their boards and secured strong influences on bank-
ing practices. The boards of  financial institutions were directly elected by Parliament “to 
ensure an equal distribution of  the patronage powers they hold between the political 
parties. […] This gave politically appointed board members a key position in deciding 
the fortunes of  individuals and firms” (Kristinsson 1996, 439). The uneven weight of  
the vote further enhanced the pork-barrel politics in the overly represented rural areas. 
The politics of  patronage declined after 1960 due to a combination of  several develop-
ments in Icelandic society, such as increased professionalization in the public sector 
(Kristinsson 1996, 440). 
The upshot of  this short discussion of  the characteristics of  Icelandic politics from 
a liberal perspective is that the legislative and executive branches of  government are 
closely interwoven, as is a general feature of  parliamentary government. This has pro-
vided leading political figures in government with power that they can exercise without 
much restraint between general elections. The discussion also shows that there have not 
been clear demarcations between the political sector and the financial and cultural sec-
tors of  society. This can be criticized in light of  the liberal emphasis on the checks and 
balances of  power and the requirement of  the separation of  the world of  politics from 
other spheres of  society, two major characteristics of  the liberal model of  democracy. 
This description of  Icelandic political practices also reflects the narrow liberal idea that 
legitimacy for the exercise of  political authority is sufficiently obtained through general 
elections as long as it is within the ramifications of  law and the constitution. This is in 
line with the emphasis on the negative liberty of  the citizens, who should be left free 
from politics to enjoy life as consumers, labourers and family members in the private and 
domestic spheres. Before the financial collapse, Kristinsson (2008, 105) argued that Ice-
landers were among the nations that have adhered most strongly to the liberal idea that 
the preferences of  citizens should not influence public policy except by taking a stance 
towards the authorities in general elections. As Habermas (1999b, 247–248) put it, the 
liberal model hinges on “the institutionalization of  an economic society that is sup-
posed to guarantee an essentially non-political common good through the satisfaction 
of  private aspirations of  productive citizens”. This characteristic of  the liberal model of  
democracy was further strengthened by the liberalization and de-regulation policies in 
the advent of  the financial crisis, as will be discussed below.
If  we look at the characteristics of  Icelandic politics from a republican perspective, 
quite different features come to the fore. As I said before, the struggle for independence 
from Denmark put lasting marks on Icelandic politics. It has been a prevalent view that 




from forces that seek to undermine it (Hálfdanarson 2001, 144; Einarsson 2014, 18). 
The largest political party throughout the political history of  the Icelandic Republic is 
the Independence Party, a right-wing party which has been dominant in forming the 
political practices that I have briefly described and criticized from a liberal perspective. 
Unlike in other Nordic countries, social democrats and liberal right-wing parties who 
are internationally oriented have been relatively weak. I will not venture into discussing 
the complex and ambiguous notion of  nationalism in this context except insofar as it 
provided a soil for certain versions of  both liberal and republican democratic practices. 
It could be argued that in the Icelandic context, nationalism functioned primarily as 
“collective self-identification” which sustained “democratic citizenship” and solidarity 
among the citizens of  the nation state (Habermas 1999a; Hálfdanarson 2001, 224–225). 
Clearly, such ideas can be harnessed in the service of  special economic interests as well 
as national interests, for example by making them one and the same.10 This could serve 
an important ideological role in facilitating the stronghold of  a rhetorical legislature at 
the cost of  functional executive institutions, fuelled by a professional mentality which 
provides resistance to special interests. It has also been convincingly argued (Jónsson 
1995), however, that nationalism fuelled economically progressive ideas which sustained 
the struggle for national self-governance. In any event, the reference to nationalism has 
been strong in the political discourse: “The discourse of  the independence movement, 
its myths and ideals, still mould the mentality of  Icelandic politicians and the general 
public. […] Icelandic politicians fully realize that nothing sparks the interests of  Icelan-
dic voters as the discourse of  nationalism” (Hálfdanarson 2001, 246–247). 
However, nationalism is not republicanism, even though a characteristic feature of  
the latter is that the rule of  self-government expresses the national will. It is only when 
the collective concept of  national freedom is interpreted in a conservative communitar-
ian language of  shared values and traditions that republicanism takes on certain fea-
tures of  nationalism (Habermas 1999b, 244–245). As we will see below, this version of  
republicanism became dominant in the wake of  the financial collapse, although it was 
also in contention with a more international version of  demand for direct democracy 
(Kristjánsdóttir 2018). But in spite of  pervasive nationalism, it is difficult to discern clear 
traces of  republicanism in formal practices or policies in the political history of  Iceland. 
Throughout the history of  the Republic, there have been movements, mostly outside 
of  the formal political domain, that have explicitly emphasized republican ideas. A clear 
example of  this is the Constitutional Society (Stjórnarskrárfélagið), established 1953 with 
the aim of  introducing “national rule” rather than “party rule”. The Republican Party 
(Lýðveldisflokkurinn) was founded in the same period and stressed the importance of  
changing the Constitution, partly with the liberal aim of  distinguishing more clearly be-
tween the legislative, executive and judicial powers. Both these and other similar move-
ments emphasized the need to uproot political corruption and maintained that one way 
to do that is to find ways to move the power more to the people (Kristjánsdóttir 2018). 
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…a polemical understanding of  politics as directed against the state 
apparatus. In […] opposition to the acquisition of  legitimation 
through entrenched parties, the political public sphere should be revi-
talized to the point where a regenerated citizenry can […] appropriate 
the governmental authority that has been usurped by a self-regulating 
bureaucracy (Habermas, 1999b, 247).
However, for the most part, these ideas have been on the fringes in Icelandic politics and 
did not find fruitful soil until after the financial collapse in the fall of  2008.
3. Analysis of the financial collapse
In the last decade of  the twentieth century and the first decade of  the twenty-first cen-
tury, Icelandic society underwent major changes (Magnússon 2008). This was a time of  
de-regulation and liberalization in the sense that the state loosened its grips on many 
sectors in society that had been subject to state control. This was partly due to the treaty 
between the European Union and Iceland about the European Economic Area and 
partly due to stronger domestic laissez-faire politics. The combination of  the two later 
proved to be a poisonous mixture because Icelanders adopted the legal framework for 
financial corporations without setting restrictions appropriate for the size of  the local 
economy. When the banks were privatized in 2002, they had a large leeway which they 
used for huge growth, enabled also by easy access to loans and a risky international busi-
ness model. When the financial crisis started in 2008, the Icelandic banks were extremely 
vulnerable, and the Icelandic financial system collapsed in early October 2008. After the 
fall of  the banks, the Icelandic Parliament set up a Special Investigation Commission 
(SIC) to find out what happened and to explain the main causes of  the financial col-
lapse (SIC 2010; Johnsen 2014). The Parliament also set up a Working Group on Ethics 
(WGE) to determine whether flawed morality and working practices had played a role in 
the course of  events (WGE 2010).
The report with the results of  these investigations entailed detailed descriptions and 
analyses of  practices in politics and administration which are instructive for the current 
task. A key passage in the Executive Summary of  the SIC-report (2010, Vol. 1, Ch. 2, 
17) summarizes in a nutshell the situation in Icelandic society just before the financial 
collapse: 
It is […] clear that when the size of  the financial system of  a country 
is, for instance, threefold its gross domestic product, the competent 
authorities of  the country have, in general, the potential to set rules 
for the financial system to comply with and to ensure compliance 
with such rules. However, when the size of  the financial system of  a 
country is nine times its gross domestic product the roles are reversed. 
This was the case in Iceland. It appears that both the parliament and 




able limits to the financial system. All the energy seems to have been 
directed at keeping the financial system going. It had grown so large, 
that it was impossible to risk that even one part of  it would collapse.
This passage demonstrates vividly the impasse that the policies of  the Icelandic govern-
ment had led to. The authorities had facilitated this development not only by an ideo-
logical hands-off  policy but also by actively encouraging the financial sector to grow so 
that it would become a major pillar for the Icelandic economy. Through these policies, 
the liberal idea of  the separation of  the world of  politics from other spheres of  society 
led to the domination of  the political by the financial sector. Moreover, the financial sec-
tor prevailed in other sectors of  Icelandic society as well, such as the social and cultural 
domains, where several projects were funded by the CSR programs of  the banks. This 
fed into strong national solidarity with the banks, where “politicians, public officials and 
regulators were all on the same team”, as Lars Christensen, chief  analyst at the Danish 
bank, put it (WGE 2010, 158). This solidarity was particularly striking and momentous 
when leading politicians, academics and bankers joined hands in responding to foreign 
criticism about the standing of  the banks at a crucial time shortly before their collapse 
(Árnason 2015). A media report commissioned by the WGE concluded that the expan-
sion of  the banks and the activities of  the bankers were primarily portrayed in a positive 
light in the media, which was mostly owned by the major financial groups (Guðmunds-
son et al. 2010). This development was fuelled by a nationalist discourse (Einarsson 
2014, 84–86) which deafened many to the signals of  warning that were given by special-
ists both abroad and at home (WGE 2010, 160–163).
As a consequence, there was no independent voice, and the main actors and institu-
tions of  democratic society, who were supposed to protect the public interest, failed 
to resist the development that took place in Icelandic society in the advent of  the fi-
nancial crisis. Eventually, the political authorities of  the country were paralysed in the 
face of  their own product, an enormous financial system characterized by extensive 
cross-ownership which implied that if  one bank collapsed, the others would follow 
(SIC 2010, Vol. 7, Ch. 21). It is ironic that this process was initiated by a liberal project 
to privatize the Icelandic banks, which had been firmly in the grips of  the political par-
ties. The main political parties had their representatives on their boards and secured 
strong influences on banking practices. In the first phases of  the privatization, sound 
principles were laid down in order to prevent such political control of  the financial 
sector. But during the process, these principles were betrayed, and the privatization 
ended up as a political deal between the two parties that historically had maintained 
the main presence in the state-owned banks. The banks were sold to relatively inexpe-
rienced bankers and investors who were on speaking terms with these political parties. 
In that way, the strong ties between politics and finance that were meant to be severed 
with the privatization were instead strengthened in a new and less transparent form. 
As a consequence, a privatization policy which in theory was a liberalizing separation 
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business and politics” that has characterized Icelandic society (Vaiman, Sigurjonsson & 
Davídsson 2011, 260).
This development can also be assessed from the perspective of  negative liberty of  
the citizens (characteristic of  liberal democracy), that is, that they are to enjoy freedom 
from political participation in between general elections. The booming years in the ad-
vent of  the financial crisis marked the heyday of  consumerism in the country. Icelanders 
had easy access to loans, the currency was strong, which increased travelling abroad, and 
the lowest paid jobs in the service sector could be left to foreigners. The citizens were 
predominantly regarded as consumers with a maximum liberty for consumption, “living 
as well-fed, well-clothed, and well entertained vassals” (Sen 2000, 288). This was part of  
the prevailing political ideology in which the emphasis on freedom as non-interference 
is related to a belief  that it will bring about economic prosperity. Individuals are to be 
provided with optimal conditions to maximize profit and consumption, which will bring 
wealth to the entire social body and happiness to the citizens. Some memorable com-
ments from leading politicians at the time are revealing in this regard. In justifying the 
privatization policy of  his government, Prime Minister Davíð Oddsson (1999) talked 
about “feeding the passion for possession” (að ýta undir eignagleðina). And in a response 
to criticism from the opposition in the Parliament in 2007, the minister of  economy 
(Mathiesen 2007) said, “Don‘t you see the feast, boys?“ (Drengir, sjáið þið ekki veisluna?). 
Surely, the consumer citizens were enjoying the feast and, unaware of  what was going 
on, were strongly motivated to believe the success story about the banks (Þórisdóttir 
2010). The nationalist solidarity also played a significant role here, as Kaarlo Jännäri 
(2009, 22, 37), former director general of  the Financial Supervision Authority in Fin-
land, observed:
The nation, up to its highest echelons, supported and admired the 
banks […]. The supervisors were too timid and lacked legal author-
ity in their efforts to intervene in these developments, but the overall 
national pride in the success of  the banks would probably have made 
it futile even to try while the going was good and success followed 
success. By the time the tide turned, it was too late, and there was too 
little that could be done to avoid catastrophe.
The catastrophe of  the financial collapse seems to demonstrate that the Icelandic au-
thorities failed in meeting the all-important standard of  liberal politics by failing to 
protect the citizens. David Held (2006, 78) described the principle of  justification for 
“protective democracy” thusly: “Citizens require protection from the governors, as well 
as from each other, to ensure that those who govern pursue policies that are commen-
surate with citizens’ interests as a whole”. In light of  this principle, the financial collapse 
marked a major failure in the way liberal politics had been practised in Iceland. But the 
reactions of  the authorities to the collapse are just as important for this assessment. I 




officials that bore the primary responsibilities for the policies in the advent of  the crisis 
saw the collapse as a reason for resignation. The prevailing attitude was that it was more 
responsible to actively deal with the consequences of  the collapse than to resign and 
leave that task to others. The second is that the Parliament decided to set up a special 
commission to thoroughly investigate the causes of  the events. It is noteworthy that the 
SIC was given unprecedented and unlimited investigative powers where members of  
Parliament, including the members of  the government who had failed to control the 
financial sector in the years preceding its downfall, were themselves under investiga-
tion. This reaction of  the Parliament was facilitated by work that had been going on to 
strengthen parliamentary practices, particularly how the executive branch of  govern-
ment could more be effectively supervised (Report 2009; Sigurgeirsdóttir 2018). The 
third relevant reaction is that the government gave in to persistent pressure and public 
riots, resigned in January 2009 and announced general elections (Bernburg 2016).
From a liberal perspective, these three reactions give mixed signals. The first and 
the third indicate a prevalent feature of  Icelandic political culture that political authori-
ties hold onto their positions of  power as long as they possibly can. In this case, they 
did not resign until they were literally forced out by angry citizens. This can be seen 
as a minimal requirement of  liberal politics. The second reaction, however, to initiate 
a massive investigation where no stone should be left unturned goes beyond what a 
liberal government would be expected to do. The Icelandic Parliament decided not 
only to investigate the causes of  the collapse from the prevailing perspectives of  law 
and economics but decided to also take the dimensions of  morality and governance 
into account. Moreover, the ethical investigation was not limited to the financial sector; 
working practices and governance in other sectors of  society could also be subjected 
to critical scrutiny as members of  the WGE saw fit. Thus, the WGE could place the 
SIC analyses explicitly into political and cultural contexts (Árnason 2010). Its conclu-
sion (WGE 2010, 243) stated that the problems of  morality and working practices were 
deep-seated and systemic:
Although several individuals certainly are guilty of  reprehensible con-
duct which must be appropriately dealt with, it is misleading to focus 
on them. From a moral viewpoint it is most important in the long 
run to strengthen democratic structures of  society and the political 
system; to improve practices and professionalism in business, govern-
ance and politics.
4. Lessons and reactions
The WGE’s conclusion drew upon the thorough descriptions in the SIC report, largely 
based on the testimonies of  the main actors in the financial sphere as well as those 
responsible for decisions in politics and administration, and detailed analyses of  the 
course of  events leading up to the financial collapse. These descriptions revealed flawed 
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professionalism and unclear ideas and processes of  accountability. This is succinctly put 
in the Executive Summary of  the SIC (2010, Vol. 1, Ch. 2, 18):
[T]he representatives and administrators of  those governmental in-
stitutions, that had the role of  monitoring operations in the financial 
markets and the effects of  those operations on state economics were, 
in various cases, unaware of  who was meant to carry out and take 
responsibility for certain aspects of  these affairs in the government’s 
daily activities. It is imperative to look carefully to how the obligations 
of  individual institutions and officials may be better defined and de-
lineated, in this respect.
These factors contributed to poorly developed public policy and weak governance 
which undermined the “rational will formation” of  the authorities to use the terminol-
ogy of  deliberative democratic theory. This theory of  democracy can be described as 
a critical analysis of  existing democratic practices that aims at improving them in light 
of  the vision of  a public dialogue free from domination. It aims to improve representa-
tive democracy by strengthening the institutions that provide the conditions for better 
preparation of  policy and deliberative practices in formal politics, administration and in 
the public sphere at large. Political theorist Simone Chambers (2003, 309) described the 
main ideas of  deliberative democracy in this way:
Deliberative democratic theory critically investigates the quality, sub-
stance, and rationality of  the arguments and reasons brought to de-
fend policy and law. It studies and evaluates the institutions, forums, 
venues, and public spaces available for deliberative justification and 
accountability. It looks at the social, economic, political, and historic 
conditions necessary for healthy deliberation as well as the attitudes, 
behaviors, and beliefs required of  participants.
This describes a normative, critical perspective which envisions optimal conditions for 
rational will formation in politics, accountability for public policy and quality govern-
ance for implementing it. Although the investigations of  the SIC and WGE were not 
conducted in the spirit of  a particular theory, their criticism of  the working procedures 
in politics and administration in the advent of  the financial crisis shows strong kinship 
with these ideas. That is no coincidence. Arguments for good working practices in pub-
lic policy inevitably take ideas of  this kind into account; they are inherent to the internal 
criticism of  democracy, where it is asked how public policy can be well formed, justified 
and legitimized. In light of  such questions, the weaknesses and flaws of  Icelandic demo-
cratic practices become conspicuous.
Although the SIC and WGE report was widely acclaimed and well received, these 




democracy in the wake of  the collapse. A special parliamentary committee had the task 
of  reacting to and formulating proposals regarding the conclusions of  the report. This 
committee agreed with the report’s criticisms about poor conditions for formulating 
public policy. Understandably, the focus of  this committee was largely on the role of  
the Parliament (Report 2010a, Ch. 2.1): “The main conclusion of  the parliamentary 
committee regarding Alþingi is that there is a need to strengthen the independence 
of  the Parliament against the executive branch, more emphasis is to be laid on the 
supervisory role of  the Parliament and improve professionalism in the preparation of  
legislation”. The committee also took the WGE’s criticism of  the political culture seri-
ously and emphasized the need to improve deliberative practices and respect for facts 
in parliamentary discussion. An important part of  this attempt to improve political 
culture was a pledge that members of  Parliament would produce a code of  ethics. All 
of  this indicates a will to improve parliamentary practices in the spirit of  deliberative 
democratic theory.
Genuine though these declarations of  amelioration of  Icelandic politics may have 
been, they were not translated into practice. It is difficult to change political culture, but 
for a small nation, the soil should have been fertile in the wake of  a colossal financial 
collapse. As for the promise made by the parliamentary committee that members of  
Parliament would produce a code of  ethics, that was held in name only. Any genuine 
process of  setting of  a code of  ethics requires that the members of  the group that are 
to abide by the code themselves deliberate the issues, clarify their understanding of  the 
obligations implied in their role and articulate it in a written document. An attempt was 
made to work along these lines, but it failed (Árnason 2018). Instead, in order to check 
the box of  completed tasks, they decided to adopt the code of  ethics of  the European 
Parliament. In that way, members of  Parliament relieved themselves of  the important 
task of  reflecting on their moral duties, which could have increased their moral sensibil-
ity and deepened their understanding of  their roles as public servants and eventually 
improved democratic practices.11 But this mode of  implementation requires a compre-
hension of  the role of  such codes, and this understanding seems to have been lacking. 
The predominant attitude towards ethical codes is to regard them more like quasi-legal 
rules which restrict the leeway of  politicians rather than as guidelines for how to better 
serve in the role of  an elected representative. This attitude was made manifest when 
the government that came to power in 2013 decided not to implement the ethical code 
that had been introduced by the first government after the post-crash riots in 2009. It 
is revealing that when the prime minister of  that government was defending his case in 
relation to the Panama Papers, he insisted that he and his wife had not violated any law 
and that, in serving his country, his “morality is based on laws and regulations”.12
This type of  attitude which the WGE analysed as legalistic thinking surely played 
a part in the lack of  interest in ethical codes as a means to improve political practices. 
Such mentality also provides fruitful soil for a style of  politics where the main strategy 
is to be in a position of  power and restrict political accountability and legitimacy to 
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obstacles on the way to improved political culture and overshadowed the proposals of  
the parliamentary committee about the lessons from the SIC and WGE report. The 
first is the parliamentary committee’s proposal that four ministers of  the government 
should be prosecuted before the National Court. These charges caused major conflicts 
within Parliament, where the political affiliation of  the ministers weighed more heavily 
than an objective evaluation of  whether they were fairly charged with failing to take ac-
tion in the advent of  the financial crisis. It was a most unfortunate consequence of  the 
parliamentary process that the former prime minister eventually stood alone before the 
National Court. The Parliament, which had unanimously agreed to initiate a process of  
reconstruction based on the SIC and WGE report, was divided and wounded after fierce 
political debates concerning charges against the ministers. Thus, the National Court af-
fair undermined the task of  improving political practices.
Even more damaging in this respect was the Icesave issue, which dominated Icelan-
dic politics in the years 2009–2011, a crucial time for reconstructing society and rebuild-
ing trust in Icelandic politics. I have discussed this difficult dispute elsewhere (Árnason 
2018) and will not do so here except insofar as it affected Icelandic political culture and 
democratic practices. Two things are of  major relevance in this context: the actions of  
the president and the position of  the Progressive Party, which both have features of  
nationalist republicanism. The president’s role in the affair was to activate Article 26 
of  the Constitution by refusing twice to sign a bill from Parliament about the terms of  
the agreement between Iceland and the UK and the Netherlands. When it came to the 
referendum in January 2010, it didn’t have much significance because the agreement had 
already been withdrawn and was being renegotiated. The second referendum, in April 
2011, however, was of  major political significance. One of  the arguments in support of  
the power of  the Icelandic president to refer bills to national referenda is that it puts 
pressure on the executive and the legislative branches to uphold good working practices. 
This is what happened after the first referendum on Icesave. The government and the 
leading party of  the opposition co-operated well and worked professionally across party 
lines on this difficult issue. However, the smaller party in the opposition, the Progressive 
Party, refused to be part of  the agreement which, according to polls, was also supported 
by a good majority of  the voters.
In spite of  this, the president referred the bill a second time to a national referendum. 
In his statement when he refused to sign the bill, President Grímsson (2011a) wrote:
The fundamental consideration, which must determine the President’s 
decision, irrespective of  the merits of  the new Icesave agreements, is 
that the people have exercised legislative power in the Icesave dispute 
and that no broad consensus has been achieved on having the Althingi 
alone determine the issue on this occasion.
Thorarensen and Óskarsdóttir (2015, 152) argued that this involves a novel and con-




main characteristic of  the constitutional arrangement of  representative democracy, 
power relations have been changed and the office of  the presidency has been given new 
meaning”. The main thrust of  the change is that, instead of  regarding the nation as a 
safeguard for the president’s misuse of  power, the president is now seen as the guard-
ian of  the will of  the nation. This can be seen as a shift from a liberal understanding 
of  the checks and balances of  power to a republican understanding of  the presidency 
as a channel for the national will. In his address to the nation on New Year’s Day 2011, 
President Grímsson (2011) said that “the core of  democracy is the will of  the people”. 
At the same time, there are no clear criteria for the president to decide when the will of  
the nation is significant enough for bills to be referred to the nation. It is entirely up to 
the president’s own judgment as the custodian of  the national will.
Another reason for seeing the exercise of  the power of  the president through the 
26th Article of  the Constitution as illiberal conduct is that it has been unclear where the 
responsibility for and the burden of  justification of  political decision-making lies. It is 
a general presumption in politics (and is stressed both in the liberal and the deliberative 
democratic models) that power entails responsibility. In accordance with that, it would 
be expected that a government would have to resign if  an act of  legislation were rejected 
in a national referendum (and that the president should resign if  a bill were approved). 
A former prime minister of  Iceland (Pálsson 2011) has argued that this presumption of  
responsibility was rejected in the Icesave elections, where the understanding was that the 
result of  the referendum would have direct consequences for neither the government 
nor the president. Before the second referendum, the government had the policy not to 
speak on behalf  of  the bill, and the president emphasized his substantial neutrality about 
the issue. In effect, the Icesave bill was a political orphan, and the pros and cons of  the 
agreement were left to the citizens themselves without responsible political guidance. 
In this way, the issue itself  was meant to be in the limelight of  the elections, untainted 
by the positions of  the electorate towards the government or the president that could 
be determined by other matters. However, as has been aptly said in a different context, 
the risk is that such use of  a national referendum on major political issues “ratifies the 
unconditional surrender of  representative to plebiscitarian will formation” (Offe 2017, 
22). The arguments of  the spokesmen against the Icesave bill were shot through with 
nationalist ideas, which may have been decisive for the outcome of  the referendum 
(Hálfdánarson 2009).
Another important reaction to the SIC report was a work of  a committee commis-
sioned by the prime minister assigned with the task of  making proposals about how 
governance and working practices in public administration could be improved. The 
committee put forth five major proposals (Report 2010b, 2–3): (1) to take action to 
strengthen the professional side of  the administration; (2) to improve working practices 
and conditions for the political leadership of  the executive branch of  government; (3) 
to clarify the obligations of  public officials and increase discipline in governance, for 
example, in documentation of  information; (4) to demarcate the role, authority and 
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executive branch with stronger external control, especially from the minority in Parlia-
ment, but also from public discussion in the media and academic institutions.  Another 
report from a committee on revision of  the laws about government offices in Iceland 
also emphasized the need to strengthen governance, for example, by clarifying the role 
of  ministers and increasing their accountability, yet reducing their independence by em-
phasizing consultation within the cabinet about policy making (Report 2010, 3). This 
report became the basis for a revised law on the Icelandic government offices which, 
among other things, implied a code of  ethics for its employees.
Although not phrased in those terms, these proposals can be seen as strengthening 
the deliberative underpinnings of  governance and public policy-making that, in turn, 
improve the general conditions for quality governance and accountability which are key 
features of  discourse democratic practices. It requires a separate study to find out to 
what extent these proposals have been implemented in the Icelandic system of  gov-
ernance and how they may have influenced political practices. But it is of  considerable 
interest in this context that these ideas have rarely been associated with attempts to 
strengthen Icelandic democracy. To the contrary, proposals of  this kind tend to be as-
sociated with “good governance at the cost of  democracy” (Ólafsson 2014a, 119). This 
attitude implies that the process of  democratization is limited to “attempts to increase 
the role of  public participation in political decision making” (Ólafsson 2014b, 11). This 
participatory emphasis has dominated Icelandic discourse about democracy in the wake 
of  the financial collapse. This is understandable in light of  the fact that trust in political 
institutions plummeted after the collapse and has not been restored in spite of  econom-
ic recovery.13 This situation provides fertile soil for republican ideas of  direct democracy 
in opposition to formal politics and the state apparatus. These ideas found two differ-
ent kinds of  channels that need to be distinguished: 1) the dormant republican feature 
already in the Icelandic Constitution that the president could refer legislative decisions 
to the nation and 2) efforts of  the post-crash authorities to meet public demands about 
having more political influence. 
I have already discussed and briefly analysed the president’s decisions to send bills 
about Icesave to national referenda and argued that his reasons for them have clear 
republican features about the role of  the nation in the legislative process. The channels 
for republican ideas activated by the government mainly related to plans to revise the 
Constitution. A new bill about national referenda was passed as law from the Parliament 
in 2010, and two national gatherings were held in 2009 and 2010. The national forum in 
2009 was a citizens’ initiative but was supported by the government as a venue to discuss 
national values and mould a new social contract for a nation at a crossroads: “New cir-
cumstances require re-evaluation of  the basic values upon which society is founded and 
a clearer vision for the future”.14 To reach this objective, over 1,200 people selected ran-
domly from the population gathered together for a day in Reykjavík‘s main sports arena. 
For a disillusioned nation in shock after the financial collapse, this could have been a 
valuable enterprise, but due to the ideology and methodology of  the national forum, it 




its only results were quantification of  the popularity of  general moral ideas which are 
essentially contestable, such as honesty, justice and equality, it received international at-
tention as a significant democratic exercise (Legaspi 2010).
Of  greater consequence was the decision of  the Icelandic government to use this 
national forum as a model for “crowd sourcing” ideas to feed into a new constitutional 
assembly. The objective of  the national forum in 2010 was “to call for the principal 
viewpoints and points of  emphasis of  the public concerning the organisation of  the 
country’s government and its constitution”.15 This was a commendable objective, but 
the method chosen for calling for the viewpoints and concerns of  the public were seri-
ously flawed. As before, the emphasis was on collecting as many ideas as possible that 
were condensed into single statements or slogans, demonstrated in a “cloud of  ideas”. 
It was not permissible to subject these statements to rational debate, nor was there time 
to test their relevance by relating them to complex political issues. As a consequence, the 
participants never got their teeth into the real food for thought in democratic society 
(Árnason 2013b, 214):
The interesting thing to discuss is what these values mean, what impli-
cations they have for particular social policies, and what powers stand 
in the way of  implementing such policies. There is a need to inquire 
about administrative practices through which policies are delivered 
and the system of  political, legal as well as administrative mechanisms 
by which elected officials are held accountable. Such a discussion takes 
time, invites conflict and the exchange of  arguments, all of  which was 
deliberately avoided and excluded in the national forums.
In this case, however, a constitutional committee processed the ideas of  the national 
forum and prepared them in the form of  a working paper for a Constitutional Council. 
The Council, which was assigned with the task of  revising the Icelandic Constitution, 
often referred to the products of  the national forum as reasons for certain revisions. In 
public debates about the proposals of  the Constitutional Council, some of  its staunch-
est spokesmen have referred to the results of  the national forum as the “will of  the peo-
ple” which must be respected (Gylfason 2012a). In so doing, the statements collected 
in a brainstorming session that could have fed into public debate were instead used to 
silence it in the name of  democracy. The same can be said about the use of  a national 
referendum that was held about some of  the proposals of  the Constitutional Council 
in October 2012. Even though the main conclusion of  this advisory referendum was 
that a large majority of  Icelanders agreed with the statement that the proposals of  the 
Constitutional Council will serve as a basis of  a bill for a new Constitution, it has often 
been interpreted as a binding result to adopt the bill of  the Constitutional Council (Les-
sig 2016). The purpose of  the referendum was never clear, and Kristinsson (2012, 569) 
argued that “the aim was to silence discussion and hinder further comments from those 
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The third main manifestation of  the republican emphasis in post-collapse politics in 
Iceland were the proposals of  the Constitutional Council in which the role of  the citi-
zens in the political process was radically increased. This was in line with ideas that had 
been popular in the National Assembly which reflected demands for direct democracy 
in society at large. In the notes with the bill about the new Constitution, it says that many 
in the Assembly had been of  the opinion that “increased participation of  the public in 
decision-making would increase political maturity and responsibility of  voters and be 
conducive to more agreement in society” (Bill 2011, art. 106). This statement implies the 
development argument, which is one of  the core features of  republicanism. The Consti-
tutional Council took a strong stance towards increasing direct democracy by proposing 
that 10 percent of  the voters could demand that an act of  Parliament be submitted to a 
national referendum (art. 66). In addition to this, the right of  the president to refer an act 
of  Parliament to the judgment of  the nation was preserved (art. 61). The citizens were 
also granted the right to take the initiative to propose a bill in Parliament, and for this, 
only 2 percent of  the voters were needed (art. 67). However, Parliament had no obliga-
tion to deliberate a bill from the public unless 10 percent of  the voters were behind it. If  
Parliament did not bring this to completion and it had not been withdrawn by the voters 
who brought it forth, this could result in a national referendum (art. 133).
These proposals about radically increasing direct, vote-centric democracy were con-
troversial, and it was argued that no research had been undertaken to show what effects 
these proposals would have on political practices (Kristinsson 2012, 567). But the bill of  
the Constitutional Council also had proposals that could be seen to strengthen political 
practices from the perspectives of  the liberal and discourse theoretical models of  de-
mocracy. For example, in a liberal spirit, the bill aimed to sharpen the division of  power 
between the branches of  government, even the weight of  each vote, and strengthen 
the independence of  state agencies and parliamentary investigation committees. The 
deliberative underpinnings of  political practices could be strengthened by proposals to 
increase the freedom of  the media, transparency in governance and the citizens’ right to 
information (Gylfason 2012, 17, 31). Some of  these proposals could be seen as intend-
ing to improve the working practices in politics and administration that were harshly 
criticized in the SIC and WGE report. It is ironic, therefore, that among the main rea-
sons why this attempt to revise the Constitution failed is how poorly the process was 
prepared and governed. The chair of  the Constitutional Council has since argued that it 
was never made clear by the authorities what the objective was of  involving the public 
in the revision of  the Constitution or exactly what the procedure of  handling the pro-
posals of  the Constitutional Council would be (Nordal 2015, 137). The Constitutional 
Council, however, “made a point of  distancing itself  from Parliament […], the members 
seeing themselves as representing the common public rather than the privilege[d] elite” 
(Einarsson 2014, 179). Here we encounter a well-known republican theme in which an 
appeal to the national will is articulated in opposition to the formal political system.
The lack of  sufficient preparation of  the procedure for revising the Constitution was 




cal issues. It was bound to invite serious ideological conflict and strategic use of  political 
power. In such cases, it cannot be expected that a consensus be reached on all substantial 
issues, but it is crucial to have an agreement about how matters are to be handled and 
brought to a reasonable conclusion. This is one of  the main lessons of  the discourse 
democratic model of  democracy about how political authority and administrative power 
is legitimized and exercised. A major requirement of  this is quality governance and well-
functioning institutions which provide the pillars of  a mature democratic culture. If  that 
is lacking, the general political will that has been formed in the public sphere will not be 
able to find effective means for realization. This has been the case in Icelandic society, 
which has experienced phenomenal economic recovery in recent years, but the political 
sphere has lagged behind and has been ridden with scandals rooted in a weak political 
culture.
5. Conclusion
I have discussed Icelandic political practices in light of  three key features of  the liberal, 
republican and discourse democratic models of  democracy. I criticized Icelandic politics 
from a liberal perspective, primarily because of  the unclear separation of  powers of  
government and for extensive political involvement in other social sectors. I also argued 
that while republican characteristics are reflected in strong nationalist discourse rooted 
in the struggle for independence from Denmark, republicanism has, for the most part, 
been marginal in Icelandic politics. I conjectured, however, that nationalism provided an 
ideological soil for political practices characterized by weak resistance to special interests 
identified with national interests. Around the turn of  the last century, Icelandic society 
underwent a process of  liberalization in which power shifted to the financial sector 
without disentangling the close ties that had prevailed between business and politics. 
In the investigative report on the causes of  the financial collapse, Icelandic politics 
and governance was heavily criticized for flawed working practices and lack of  profes-
sionalism. I argued that that the appropriate lesson to draw from this criticism was to 
strengthen democratic practices and institutions in the spirit of  deliberative democratic 
theory. While official reactions to the report have emphasized the need to improve the 
political system and practices, the dominant view after the financial collapse has been 
on increasing direct, vote-centric participation in the spirit of  republicanism in opposi-
tion to the system of  formal politics. While this development is understandable in light 
of  the loss of  trust in political institutions in the wake of  the financial collapse, it has 
not led to improvement of  the political culture. It follows from my analysis that the 
reconstructive task in Icelandic politics needs to be guided more by certain feature of  
discourse democratic theory, aiming at strengthening the deliberative underpinnings of  
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